COLD WAR HISTORY: HOW DID THE ATOMIC AGE AFFECT GEOPOLITICS?

The Cold War begins as the world enters the atomic age.  By the end of the 1950s, with the advent of hydrogen nuclear device capabilities on both sides, long-range bomber aircraft, and ICBMs, how did the nuclear factor impact how the Cold War was prosecuted by both the US and the USSR?  What were the limits of threatening nuclear retaliation as a way to achieve policy ends?

Paradoxically, the ultimate weapons of war—nuclear devices—were the main reason the Cold War did not turn hot.  Nuclear weapons limited the pursuit of policy ends by heightening the risk of military showdowns between the superpowers. This is evident in three evolutionary phases that shaped American and Soviet policy in the Cold War: US nuclear monopoly (1946-1949), advocacy of “limited” nuclear weapons (1950-1953), and mutually assured destruction (1953 to 1991).

During the US nuclear monopoly phase following WWII, the Grand Alliance between the USSR and the West disintegrated in a geopolitical contest for spheres of influence. After securing territory in the fight against Hitler, the Soviets aimed to annex their gains to control vital access points in the Carpathians, the Baltic, and the Middle East. While there were instances of de-escalation in Finland, Turkey, and Iran, Eastern Europe became the first battleground of the Cold War’s geopolitical conflict in a nuclear world.

During this period, America’s nuclear monopoly favored a more aggressive response to Soviet expansionism. While pre-WWII US foreign policy was isolationist, the 1947 National Security Act transformed the US military from an expeditionary force into a standing army, and operationalized global national security with the DOD, CIA, and National Security Council. This new “Truman Doctrine” was articulated in the President’s speech to Congress, in which he declared, “It must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”[1] 

With the US as the sole nuclear power, the Truman Doctrine adopted an absolutist tone. The context of Truman’s speech was a funding request to counter communist movements in Greece and Turkey. However, the doctrine’s first major test of resolve occurred in 1948 during the Berlin Airlift. 

When the Soviets attempted to close off supply corridors to West Berlin, the American response was aggressive, refusing to yield to Soviet military pressure by flying in cargo planes.  Although Berlin was situated hundreds of miles deep within East Germany, the US pushed directly against the Soviet Air Force.  Neither side provoked the other to the brink of war, and ultimately, the Soviets backed down. Retrospectives on the Berlin airlift depict it as the first instance of “managed” conflict, where wars are fought not to be won but rather to avoid being lost.[2] Viewed through a nuclear lens, it also illustrates that the US was willing to challenge the Soviet military. There was no serious risk of nuclear war, since only the US possessed the bomb.

However, in August 1949, the Soviets emerged as a nuclear peer, prompting changes in policies and behaviors. Building on the 1947 National Security Act, the US signed the NATO treaty and adopted a more aggressive containment doctrine, as outlined in NSC-68. The US surrounded the USSR with military bases.  In response, the Soviets felt an urgency to consolidate their geopolitical gains.

In this second phase, when both sides possessed nuclear weapons with yields comparable to those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the nuclear threat tempered direct superpower provocations.  Yet some defense planners during this perilous period still viewed nuclear weapons as a valid military strategy.  This is best illustrated by the Korean conflict when MacArthur proposed using nuclear weapons against targets in Manchuria.  Truman feared a wider war with the Soviets that could escalate to nuclear levels—ultimately relieving MacArthur of his command.[3]  This marked the first time a hot war was constrained by shared superpower access to nuclear weapons.

The third phase began in 1953 with the development of the hydrogen bomb. In this phase, it was assumed that the ladder of escalation could ultimately lead to the planet’s destruction. If nuclear yields had remained smaller and their delivery vehicles limited, policymakers might still have considered tactical nuclear weapons a viable battlefield option. However, with the advent of the hydrogen bomb, strategic bombers, and ICBMs, the calculus changed.

Hungary exemplifies this third phase.  In October 1956, Hungarian students challenged Soviet rule, prompting the Eisenhower administration to encourage revolt. Echoing the Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower released a statement referencing human rights and denouncing Soviet actions.[4] But he offered no American support.  Unlike the absolutist stance of the Truman Doctrine, when 200,000 Soviet troops descended on Budapest, Eisenhower was unwilling to risk nuclear escalation.[5]

[1] “Truman Doctrine (1947),” National Archives, September 28, 2021, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/truman-doctrine.

[2] Gvosdev, “HIST E-1960 -Lec 4.”

[3] Powaski, The Cold War.

[4] “Statement by the President on the Developments in Hungary | The American Presidency Project,” accessed March 16, 2025, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-the-developments-hungary.

[5] Powaski, The Cold War.